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Within contemporary Scottish policy guidance, abortion is routinely conﬁgured as evidence of a resolv-
able problem with the healthcare provision of contraception. This article draws on 42 semi-structured
interviews with Scottish health professionals conducted during 2007e2008, in order to explore how,
and in what form, realities of contraception/abortion are sustained within abortion practice. In addition
to providing empirical insights concerning this sociologically neglected aspect of reproductive health-
care, it demonstrates how a novel conceptual approach could be used to develop existing social scientiﬁc
analyses of the provision of techniques of fertility prevention. Science and Technology Studies (STS) has
highlighted the importance of studying the complex socio-material practices through which realities are
enacted (or ‘performed’). Mobilising this insight, my analysis illustrates the complex socio-material work
required to enact abortion as evidence of a ‘problem’ with contraception that is resolvable within the
healthcare consultation. This work, I argue, renders visible the ontologically ‘multiple’ (Mol, 2002) nature
of contraception/abortion, with important implications for both social science and policy approaches to
these techniques of fertility prevention.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license. Introduction
Policy guidance concerning sexual health services in Scotland
positions the provision of contraceptive advice during consulta-
tions about abortion as a means through which to reduce the rates
of the latter:
Approximately 1 in 4 women who have a termination of
pregnancy subsequently have another termination of preg-
nancy. Advice about effective contraception following
termination of pregnancy is essential to reduce termination
of pregnancy rates. (NHS Quality Improvement Scotland,
2008, p. 15)
Accordingly, recent standards for Scottish abortion services
require explicitly that:
60% of women leave the facility with one of the more effective
methods of contraception (hormonal oral contraceptives,
intrauterine devices or contraceptive implants). (NHS Quality
Improvement Scotland, 2008, p. 15) license. Similar framings of the relationship between contraception,
abortion and reproductive healthcare are also prevalent in UK
sexual health guidance more broadly (for example, Department of
Health, 2009; Medical Foundation for AIDS & Sexual Health
(MedFASH), 2008; National Collaborating Centre for Women’s
and Children’s Health, 2005). A particularly notable example is
the recent guidance commissioned by NICE, which depicts the
provision of Long Acting Reversible Contraception (LARC) to
women as a revolutionary means to reduce the UK’s abortion rate
(National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health,
2005).
In this paper I use Scottish health professionals’ accounts of
the provision of contraceptive advice during consultations about
abortion to explore some of the implications of these forms of
guidance. My analysis of health professionals’ accounts illus-
trates the socio-material work that is necessary in order for
abortion to be enacted as evidence of a ‘ﬁxable’ problem with
contraception. In illustrating this phenomenon, I have two aims.
Firstly, to explore a neglected empirical topic, namely, the
provision of techniques of fertility prevention within contem-
porary Scottish reproductive healthcare. Secondly, to suggest
new theoretical directions for broader social scientiﬁc enquiry
concerning the provision and use of techniques of fertility
prevention.
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contraception through twentieth century medicalization in
the UK
For much of the twentieth century, all techniques of fertility
prevention were deemed illegitimate by the UK medical profession
and, more broadly, within public discourse (Brookes,1988; Hawkes,
1996; McLaren, 1990; Thomas, 1985). As McLaren (1990) demon-
strates, the gradual differentiation of contraception and abortion as
two distinct techniques was the result of a strategy employed by
the early twentieth century birth control movement. In attempt to
gain the support of the medical profession, birth control
campaigners promoted the use of relatively ‘high-tech’ pre-coital
methods (for example, the diaphragm and cap, and later,
hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices) whose use
could be planned far in advance of sex, and required clinical
supervision. In contrast, they explicitly dissociated themselves from
methods associated with (hetero)sex, or its aftermath (condoms,
‘withdrawal’ and abortion).
In spite of the campaigns of birth control activists, their advocacy
of the idea that fertility should be ‘planned’ through the use of pre-
coital contraception did not become accepted as a mainstream part
of medical practice until the 1960se70s (McLaren, 1990). McLaren
suggests that the availability of a more high-status and ‘scientiﬁc’
(Clarke, 1998) method of contraception in the form of the Pill was
critical in the profession’s change of heart concerning the goals of the
birth control movement. Another important event was that, during
the late 1960s, health professionals in much of the UK suddenly
became faced with responsibility for the provision of abortion
(Aitken-Swann, 1977; Davis & Davidson, 2005; Hawkes, 1996;
McLaren, 1990; Thomas, 1985). The 1967 Abortion Act re-classiﬁed
abortion as a ‘medical’, rather than a ‘criminal’ act (Sheldon, 1997)
by deﬁning legal grounds on which two doctors could agree that it
was necessary in the interests of a pregnant woman’s health, or the
health of her foetus. In doing so, it gave doctors formal responsibility
for the decision about whether or not a particular pregnancy should
be terminated (Davis & Davidson, 2005).
The legislative framework introduced by the 1967 Abortion Act
continues to regulate the provision of abortion in the UK (with the
notable exception of Northern Ireland, to which this Act has never
been applied, and where abortion remains largely unavailable).
While it has, arguably, facilitated the widespread provision of safe,
legal procedures (Sheldon, 1997) the law nonetheless legitimates
abortion only as a last resort course of action necessary to alleviate
the suffering of a patient whose unwanted pregnancy constitutes
a threat to her mental and/or physical wellbeing (Boyle, 1997;
Sheldon, 1997). Negative framings of abortion clearly inﬂuenced
the incorporation of contraceptive provision into UK healthcare;
this was positioned as necessary ‘to prevent illegitimacy and
abortion rather than to promote sexual freedom’ (Thomas, 1985, p.
52). While illegitimacy is no longer an explicit policy concern, the
guidance cited above demonstrates that concerns about the
prevention of abortion remain signiﬁcant.
Conceptual framework
The signiﬁcance of professional practice concerning the provi-
sion of contraceptive advice to women seeking abortion was ﬁrst
highlighted by Luker (1975) in her ground-breaking study of
contraceptive ‘risk taking’. In an exploration of the non-use of
contraception by women who request abortion, Luker argued that
competing perceptions of the meanings of contraception and
unwanted pregnancy/abortion are held by women and medical
institutions. She suggested that the latter assume that the most
signiﬁcant ‘cost’ of (hetero)sex is ‘unplanned’ pregnancy/abortion.Simultaneously, medical institutions minimise the costs of
contraception, and stigmatise women who refuse to bear these
costs as either ‘ignorant’ or ‘self-destructive and irrational’ (Luker,
1975, p. 140).
The central aim of Luker’s study was to destabilise these
assumptions by illustrating that, when contraception is situated
within the lived context of its use, its non-use becomes an entirely
rational act. She argues that:
risk-taking behaviour which ends in an unwanted pregnancy is
the result of a “rational” decision-making chain produced by
a person who is acting in what he or she perceives to be his or
her best interests, although often in the presence of faulty data.
(Luker, 1975, p. 138)
Costs of contraception can include, for example, the side-effects
of hormonally-based contraceptives, the routine interactions with
clinicians that these drugs necessitate, and costs to identities and
relationships. In particular, as Luker points out, to obtain and make
use of a contraceptive involves the cost of acknowledging to oneself
and others (often health professionals) that one is planning to be
sexually active. In contrast to these immediate costs of contracep-
tion, ‘unplanned’ pregnancy/abortion represents an unknown
future cost which may be ‘discounted’, or may in some cases be
viewed as a beneﬁt, for example, an opportunity to test a male
partner’s commitment (Luker, 1975).
However, as Paxson (2004) highlights, while Luker’s work
provides valuable insights, it replicates an important aspect of the
institutional discourse which it sets out to critique. As numerous
commentators have noted (Ali, 2002; Paxson, 2004; Ruhl, 2002) the
medicalization of techniques of fertility control is grounded in
a socially speciﬁc construction of human subjectivity. Speciﬁcally, it
reﬂects Western Enlightenment philosophy’s account of subjec-
tivity as contingent upon an individual’s ability to abstract them-
selves from ‘time, space, and bodily circumstances’ (Ruhl, 2002, p.
644) in order to make rational-calculative decisions that maximise
self-interest. In the case of techniques of fertility control, medical
institutions view self-interest as maximised when women have
control over the timing of conception. While Luker successfully
illustrates that this is not the only way in which women can realise
their interests, she nonetheless portrays the autonomous, rational,
calculation of self-interest as the basis for women’s contraceptive
(non)use. In other words, she concurs with institutional logics
concerning the forms of human agency which it is possible to exert
in relation to techniques of fertility control (Paxson, 2004).
In contrast to Luker’s analysis, anthropological studies have
instead sought to illustrate how cultural norms (in particular, those
concerning sexuality and fertility) shape the forms of agency which
people exert through their engagement with techniques of fertility
prevention. For example, Paxson (2004) demonstrates that, in
Greece, women’s use of techniques of fertility prevention has
historically been oriented towards the maintenance of gender
norms concerning masculine dominance/feminine passivity in
sexual relations. Women-controlled methods of contraception,
which require women to be pro-active in advance of sex, challenge
these relationships. In contrast, abortion provides a private, post-
hoc means for women to regulate their fertility, which does not
impinge upon the norms of heterosexual encounters. Paxson
argues that, within the Greek context, the introduction of medi-
calized models of fertility prevention in the form of ‘family plan-
ning’ initiatives can be understood as burdening, rather than
liberating, women. Such initiatives stigmatise Greek women’s use
of abortion and require them to ‘plan’ contraception, without
acknowledging that contraceptive planning also produces stigma
because it requires women to transgress local gender norms
(Paxson, 2004).
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the forms of human subjectivity facilitated by the medicalization of
techniques of fertility prevention (see also Ali, 2002), they never-
theless contain an important limitation. Speciﬁcally, they explore
how human subjectivities are negotiated in relation to techniques
of fertility preventionwithout considering how such techniques are
themselves involved with, and (re)constituted by, practices of
human meaning-making.
Other studies have emphasised the way in which human prac-
tices shape the meanings of techniques of fertility prevention
(Barrett & Harper, 2000; Georges, 1996; Renne, 1997; Russell, Sobo,
& Thompson, 2000; Simonds & Ellertson, 2004; Ziebland,1999). For
example, Ziebland (1999) illustrates how the medicalized framing
of contraception as a technique to be planned and used in advance
of sexual activity leads UK health professionals to demarcate
emergency contraception (a technique used up to 72 h after
intercourse) as distinct and problematic in relation to other
contraceptives. However, even in studies such as this, techniques of
fertility prevention are explored only in terms of the ways that they
are conceptually shaped by social norms. There is no consideration
of the ways in which the materiality of these techniques may be
shaped by, or indeed may be involved in, practices of human
meaning-making.
This omission reﬂects a broader pattern in existing social
scientiﬁc literature concerning the provision of techniques of
fertility prevention, namely, the bracketing of the nonhumanworld
as uninvolved in, and unaffected by, human action. This phenom-
enon is captured in the introduction to a key text on the subject,
where Russell et al. (2000) justify the anthropological analysis of
contraception on the grounds that ‘contraceptives are [.] social
conceptions as well as physical facts’ (p. 6 e emphasis added). As
feminist Science and Technology Studies (STS) theorists have long
argued (Haraway, 1991; Roberts, 2007) the portrayal of the
nonhuman/physical world as uninvolved in practices of human
(social) interpretation is precisely what allows science to claim
a position of ‘objectivity’ in relation to the nonhumanworld, i.e. the
authority to represent this world as it ‘really’ is. By replicating
science’s positioning of the nonhuman world, existing social
scientiﬁc literature thus re-asserts the authority of medical insti-
tutions to describe the ‘reality’ of techniques of fertility prevention.
In this paper, I suggest that STS theory provides a useful means
of circumnavigating this problem. As Law (2008) notes, while STS
comprises several (often competing) theoretical strands, a crucial
analytical move which unites a great deal of its theory is the de-
centring of human agency and the acknowledgement of the live-
liness (Haraway, 1991) of the nonhuman world. Crucially, in
creating space for nonhumans (or ‘materiality’), STS does not
replicate scientiﬁc discourse by claiming social scientiﬁc access to
the ‘reality’ of such entities. Rather, its concern is to explore how
realities are ‘achieved’ or enacted (Mol, 2002, pp. 32e33) through
the inextricable, and always re-negotiable, socio-material interac-
tions of humans and nonhumans.
A key illustration of this approach within the ﬁeld of healthcare
is provided by Mol’s (2002) ethnography of a single disease e
atherosclerosis e which she ﬁnds to be ‘multiple’ through her
exploration of its enactment across different sites within the same
hospital. For example, the atherosclerosis enacted through diag-
nostic consultations with patients (where interview questions are
used to determine precisely how much pain patients experience in
their legs when walking) is not the same entity as the atheroscle-
rosis enacted through the practices of the pathology lab (where
microscopes are used to determine the degree of vessel wall
thickening in stained cross-sections of excised leg arteries). In spite
of this multiplicity, however, Mol insists that the reality of
atherosclerosis does not become plural: a single disease named‘atherosclerosis’ continues to be diagnosed and treated across
different sites of practice. This broader process, she suggests, itself
relies on particular sets of socio-material practices through which
atherosclerosis’s multiplicity is ‘co-ordinated’ (Mol, 2002, pp. 53e
85) in such a way that it can be treated.
The central point illustrated by Mol’s (2002) case study is that
‘the real is relationally enacted in [socio-material] practices,’ and
that ‘if those practices were to change the real would also be done
differently’ (Law, 2008, p. 635 e emphasis in original). Through the
analysis that follows, I aim to illustrate what social scientists might
gain by bringing STS’s focus on socio-material practices to the study
of the provision of techniques of fertility prevention.
Methods
The ﬁndings presented here are drawn from 42 semi-structured
interviews that I conducted in 2007e2008 with Scottish health
professionals concerning their involvement in abortion practice in
the absence of diagnosed foetal impairment. These interviews were
carried out as part of a broader study which set out to address
Scottish health professionals’ accounts of contemporary abortion
practice (Beynon-Jones, 2012, in press). The rationale for
researching this group of professionals was, ﬁrstly, the important
position they occupy as gate-keepers to abortion and secondly, the
absence of contemporary qualitative sociological research con-
cerning their experiences (for earlier studies and historical analysis
see Aitken-Swann, 1977; Allen, 1985; Davis & Davidson, 2005;
Horobin, 1973; Macintyre, 1977).
In contrast to England and Wales, where a large proportion of
abortions are conducted within the specialist independent sector
under NHS contract, over 99% of abortions performed annually in
Scotland are conducted in NHS hospitals (Information Services
Division Scotland, 2011). The absence of an independent sector in
Scotland means that, in order to access abortion, women must
generally be referred either by a GP or by a community sexual
health clinic to the appropriate NHS hospital service. To reﬂect this
system of provision I interviewed GPs (20), obstetrician/gynaecol-
ogists (12) and gynaecology nurses (10). A purposive approach
(Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003) was used to obtain a sample that was
as balanced as possible in terms of gender (15 men and 27 women)
and which varied in terms of age (the overall age range of the
sample was 31e61 years old) as well as the geographic/organisa-
tional location of practice (collectively, the sample was drawn from
16 different GP practices, 2 sexual health clinics and 7 hospitals). As
qualitative research, the ﬁndings presented here are not intended
to be representative; the numbers of health professionals inter-
viewed reﬂect the point at which no new research themes were
emerging during interviews.
Prior to the recruitment of participants, the study was reviewed
in accordance with the University of Edinburgh’s School of Social
and Political Studies research ethics audit process. All interviewees
had the opportunity to reﬂect upon awritten summary of the study
prior to interviews and to ask questions. Written consent was ob-
tained from all participants. Interviews were audio recorded
(except in two cases where permission was refused and where,
with permission, detailed notes were instead taken), transcribed,
and analysed with the aid of qualitative data management soft-
ware. The analysis presented here was informed by the conceptual
approach outlined above. It explored the socio-material practices
through which health professionals described enacting the reality
of contraception/abortion during the provision of contraceptive
advice in abortion consultations.
My use of interviews as a research method through which to
explore socio-material practices contains an obvious limitation.
Rather than offering an indication of the socio-material practices
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arguably evidence the purely rhetorical (social) work that is
required to enact contraception/abortion in accordance with social
norms (for example, those of UK healthcare policy). Such rhetorical
work acquires particular signiﬁcance in the context of occupations
such as abortion provision, where workers routinely have to
negotiate the social stigma attached to their clients’ actions (Harris,
Debbink, Martin, & Hassinger, 2011; Joffe, 1986; Lipp, 2011;
O’Donnell, Weitz, & Freedman, 2011). Nevertheless, while it is
important to remain aware of the rhetorical work which may be
performed through interview accounts, it seems equally inappro-
priate to dismiss interviewees’ descriptions of their day-to-day
socio-material work practices as ‘mere’ rhetorical performances.
On these grounds, in the analysis that follows I take my cue from
Mol (2002, p. 27), who suggests that social scientists should try
listening to health professionals ‘as if they were their own
ethnographers’ of the events that have happened to them.Findings
Echoing healthcare policy, interviewees routinely described
abortion as an indicator of a problemwith contraception that could
be resolved within the healthcare consultation. Crucially, however,
the target of healthcare practice is very different to that of
healthcare policy: the latter is concerned with overall ‘rates’ of
contraception/abortion usage whereas the former is concerned
with individuals’ usage of contraception/abortion. In the analysis
that follows I illustrate that, in describing how they negotiate the
complexities generated by interacting with individual users, health
professionals portray four forms of socio-material work as integral
to the enactment of abortion as evidence of a ‘ﬁxable’ problemwith
contraception. In drawing attention to the practices required for
abortion to ‘become’ evidence of a resolvable problem with
contraception, health professionals’ accounts highlight the possi-
bility of alternative practices, and hence, alternative contracep-
tions/abortions.Working on/with female subjects
Health professionals’ enactment of abortion as an indicator of
a ‘ﬁxable’ problem with contraception co-constructs a particular
form of female subjectivity. Speciﬁcally, this enactment of contra-
ception/abortion requires the naturalisation of contraceptive
control over pregnancy as an intrinsic state of ‘being’ a fertile
female subject:
.we would always kind of then try and, and hospitals would
usually do that too, sort of say well, ‘Obviously this was
unplanned, don’t want this to happen again I’m sure, need to
think about contraception,’ and we view that as contraceptive
failure, lack of contraception. [GP7, male]
I: Um and in the consultation as well would you discuss um
contraception with women at all or?
P: Yeah I meanwewould look at [.] sort of both sides of it and I
would usually start that part of the consultation by asking them,
‘You know at the time you got pregnant were [.] you using any
contraception, were you on anything [.]’ see what they say [.]
about that, what e obviously for some reason contraception has
gonewrong either because it wasn’t used, or they did something
wrong with it, or, or it failed them. [.] I would then say, ‘Well
maybe what we need to look at, assume, so let’s say assuming
we go ahead with the termination thenwe need to put a plan in
place to try and prevent you getting into this situation again andthen look at what the contraceptive options would be from
there’. (Consultant 3, female)
For Consultant 3, a woman’s capacity to produce an ‘unplanned’
pregnancy (as signiﬁed by her request for abortion) illustrates that
something has ‘gonewrong’with contraception, even in the absence
of previous contraceptive use. Likewise, for GP7, abortion represents
automatic evidence of ‘contraceptive failure’. Through such state-
ments, contraceptive control over fertility is positioned as a natural
(i.e. normal) female bodily state, which has broken down and can
be restored by health professionals e rather than a state which
women may, or may not, decide to try to achieve using techno-
logical assistance.
However, even as they naturalise contraceptive control over
pregnancy, health professionals highlight the socio-material work
required to produce this naturalisation. This is because they
position the healthcare interaction as a site where the possibility
that women might make active choices with regards to the use/
non-use of contraception/abortion is ever-present. The existence
of this alternative form of female subjectivity is highlighted (and
negated) in the previous extracts through the explicit description
of future contraceptive use as a non-choice: it is something,
health professionals emphasise, that patients ‘need to think
about’.
The work involved in naturalising contraceptive control over
pregnancy becomes particularly clear when health professionals
describe interactingwithwomenwho return to the clinic to request
subsequent abortions:
.if someone [.] was on their third termination we would say
to them, ‘You know, we can do terminations for you, obviously.
But if you’re going to repeatedly attend for terminations some of
the doctors will not sign the forms and we need to look at your
contraception e why has this problem occurred for a third
time?’ Or you may ﬁnd ladies will attend and they say they’ve
never attended before and you look back in the notes and there
is a termination sheet in their notes. And I would just say, ‘I see
you’ve attended for a termination before and, you know, has this
been a failure’ e so I would say it in the nicest possible way you
know for a second one [.] I think the worst I’ve ever seen was
[.] I think she was maybe on her fourth and we said to her, you
know, ‘This is no longer acceptable. And we can’t refuse people
to have terminations but, you know, this is not just a failure of
contraception and [.] I’m not sure if the doctor will sign the
form, so you have to make sure that your contraception is in
place or we can’t say that wewould see you back here or be able
to offer you a termination on another occasion’. So it’s said in
a very pleasant way, but ﬁrm. (Nurse 9, female)
As a woman’s number of return visits to the clinic increases, the
contraceptive ‘problem’ evidenced by abortion is located ever more
precisely as a ‘failure’ of female subjectivity (rather than, for
example, a ‘failure’ of technology). This ﬁnding replicates that of
other studies of abortion work (Joffe, 1986; Lipp, 2010; Luker, 1975;
Nicholson, Slade, & Fletcher, 2010), which have long highlighted
that women who repeatedly request abortion become demarcated
as an irresponsible group of patients by staff. In the context of this
paper, however, the analytically interesting issue is the way in
which health professionals construct their response to this
perceived problem. Speciﬁcally, they describe intensifying their
efforts to construct female subjects for whom contraception is an
automatic state of ‘being’, rather than an active choice. On the one
hand, such denials of female reproductive agency have troubling
implications for individual patients. On the other, health profes-
sionals’ descriptions of their struggles to produce particular kinds
of female subject also demonstrate that the possibilities of female
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multiple.
Working on/with female fertility
The extracts presented above highlight potential ambiguities in
the nature of the contraceptive ‘problem’ which is indicated by
abortion. Beyond particular thresholds (which varied between
health professionals), a woman’s number of previous abortions was
described as evidence of a ‘failure’ of female subjectivity. Below
these thresholds, however, health professionals talked about, ‘a
failure of contraception’ and even the possibility that contraception
might ‘fail women’ (see previous quotation from Consultant 3). In
other words, they frequently described contraceptive techniques
themselves as sites of nonhuman action which shape female
fertility.
Ultimately, in the majority of health professionals’ accounts, the
activities of nonhumans such as contraceptives were positioned as
subordinate to human actions. At the same time, however, this
positioning was described as an achievement, which requires prior
knowledge of the myriad ways in which nonhuman entities may
act:
.somebody’s got pregnant three times on the Pill. Everybody
thinks the Pill’s the be all and end all because it’s one of themost
reliable methods of contraception. And - but if somebody’s still
getting pregnant on the Pill are they not taking it correctly? Is it
the best thing for them?What - are they taking other drugs that
will interact, have they had antibiotics? [.] Are they aware of
the extra precautions you need to take, if you have diarrhea and
vomiting and things like that? (Nurse 8, female)
Through such accounts, health professionals reveal the
complexity of the socio-material work upon which the enactment
of abortion as an indicator of a ‘ﬁxable’ problemwith contraception
depends. In highlighting the possibility that human attempts to
control female fertility will be thwarted by the actions of
nonhuman entities (for example, contraceptives, other drugs,
viruses, etc.) they position the subordination of female fertility to
the rationality of ‘the will’ (Ruhl, 2002) as an intrinsically less
certain venture than it appears within policy guidance.
Working on/with clinic protocols
Another form of nonhuman action which featured with great
regularity in health professionals’ accounts was that of clinic
protocols (both electronic and paper-based). This process is evident
in the following extract, where the computer systems that monitor
patient attendance at follow-up appointments are cited as partic-
ipants in the process of correcting the contraceptive ‘problem’ that
has been signalled by a patient’s request for abortion:
.the strategy is usually well, this has happened, now we’re
going to get it sorted out, but it’s really really important that you
have effective contraception afterwards e you can become
pregnant almost immediately. So let’s think about giving you
some of the Pill now or arranging for you to have an implant put
in your arm or you come back at, you know, within a week and
have an IUD put in. So we, a very big focus is trying to prevent
repeat abortions in people. [.] We have a systemwhere if they
have made an appointment their notes will be ﬂagged up if they
don’t attend, and they get, they will get a letter to say that we’d
like to see them, we notice they haven’t, they haven’t attended,
please could they make arrangements to come, it’s important
that they have a check-up to make sure that everything’s ﬁne.
(Consultant 1, female)Likewise, the check-lists used to standardise the information
provided to and obtained from patients who request abortion in
hospital outpatient clinics were also described as playing a key role:
We have a [.] very rigid form to go through [.] basically it’s
fairly straightforward, and we just go through what would be
a normal consultation: name, age, how many pregnancies
they’ve had before whether that be live, or terminations, or
miscarriages. What they use for contraception. Last period.
Smear. We already have an ultrasound to hand. We touch on
past medical history, drug history, allergies [.]. And then we
talk about future contraception. [.] They have to leave with
some form of identiﬁable contraception following the termi-
nation. (Specialist Registrar 2, male)
The central place accorded to such protocols within health
professionals’ accounts is signiﬁcant for two reasons. Firstly, these
entities emerge as another important set of nonhuman partici-
pants in the enactment of abortion as evidence of a ‘ﬁxable’
problem with contraception. In this sense, they highlight another
form of socio-material work (interactions with protocols) that is
required to enact contraception/abortion in accordance with
policy. Secondly, however, such protocols also provide a physical
link between the contraception/abortion enacted in the clinic and
that enacted by policy. Forms such as the one described by
Specialist Registrar 2 do not simply shape the content of health
professionals’ interactions with patients. Simultaneously (as
health professionals are well aware), they allow information to be
recorded about the outcomes of these interactions (patient
appointments made and/or kept, contraceptives provided, etc.)
and thus participate in policy attempts to evaluate the ‘quality’ of
abortion services. As such, clinic protocols can be considered as
a particularly important technique of ‘co-ordination’ (Mol, 2002,
pp. 53e85) through which the contraception/abortion enacted
within the clinic become aligned with that enacted through
healthcare policy.Working on/with heterosexuality
The ﬁnal form of work that is necessary for health professionals
to enact abortion as evidence of a ‘ﬁxable’ problem with contra-
ception is the translation (Mol, 2002, pp. 72e85) of the relation-
ships of heterosexual couples into the bodily health problems of
individual women:
They just kind of assume it won’t happen to them [.] partner
doesn’t like using condoms or they don’t like using condoms, or
they got carried away. And you can understand how these things
happen but there’s still a, a risk of pregnancy with, even if you
are carried away, unfortunately, chance or statistics or whatever
doesn’t make allowances for you being carried away or your
partner not liking condoms you still can get pregnant. [.] the
form does say ‘future contraception decided’ so I would always
ask themwhat they’re planning for the [.] future [.] ‘Well, I’ll
go back to the condom’, ‘But you didn’t use it every time’. It’s just
trying [.] to get them to think about [.] the gap betweenwhat
they think they’re doing, and what they’re actually doing. (GP3,
female)
In this account, heterosexual pleasure (and power) relations are
translated into a calculable measurement: the risk that a woman
will conceive a pregnancy during heterosexual intercourse. This
process transforms an unﬁxable contraceptive problem (condoms
interfering with a heterosexual couples’ bodily pleasure) into
something (a woman’s ‘ignorance’ of the bodily risks which she is
taking through her sexual practices) which can be managed by
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women within the abortion clinic.
A related translation takes place in the following extract:
.at the end my last question would be ‘Now what [do you
wanna do] about contraception?’ And if, which they often do
say, ‘Well I’m not, never, I’m not planning to have sex again for
quite a long time or, you know, just it’s not even an issue at the
moment, I don’t even want to think about it,’ I would probably
say, ‘Well I know you feel like this right now but actually you
may not feel like this in a few weeks’ time and it’s, for you it’s
probably really important that you have good contraception.
And so although it doesn’t feel right it would be good if we could
agree, or you could agree what method you want to use. And
even if you’re not in a relationship just start it so that you’re in
control of that and [.] you have contraception.’ (Nurse 7,
female)
In this account, patients who seek abortion attempt to enact
contraception as a technique of fertility control that requires on-
going heterosexual activities/relationships. In the face of this,
Nurse 7 describes having to engage in particular kinds of interac-
tion with a patient to translate a contraceptive non-problem (the
absence of heterosexual activity) into a contraceptive problem
(individual women’s well-being) that health professionals and
women can resolve within the context of the clinic.
A ﬁnal example of the ways in which health professionals
translated heterosexuality in order to enact ‘ﬁxable’ contraceptive
problems is provided by instances inwhich interviewees’ explained
their promotion of women-controlled methods of contraception:
P: And then at the end when [.] you’ve done the referral I
always say, ‘Well [.] what are you going to use after?’ [.] I
always want my ladies to say, ‘Yes I will use this after,’ and I
probably wouldn’t let [.] them get away with, ‘Oh I don’t
know,’ I would say ‘No, you need to know’.
I: Um, what if someone says ‘I’ll use condoms’ or, or whatever, is
that?
P: I would probably not be very happy with that because I
would, I would say to them, ‘That’s ﬁne, you won’t get any
sexually transmitted diseases, but that’s for the man and you’re
the woman, and you’ll get stuck with the problem, failure rate is
ten per cent, you need something else.’ You may not push them
too much further at that point but I wouldn’t be happy with that
after a termination because something’s gone wrong, you know.
(GP10, female)
In this account, a problem that is intractable from a healthcare
perspective, namely, the gendered distribution of the burdens of
pregnancy and childcare is translated into another kind of problem:
awoman’s ‘ignorance’ of the gendered distribution of responsibility
for the prevention of these burdens. This second problem, GP10
suggests, can be addressed through education, which includes
raising awareness that the burden of women’s responsibility
includes acceptance of the use of particular contraceptive methods.
The fact that such responsibility also includes acceptance of the
bodily risks attached to these methods was stated explicitly by
several interviewees:
I do ﬁnd it a bit more difﬁcult in terms of, you know, I don’t feel
that comfortable with it [.] I think it’s [repeated abortion is]
irresponsible [.] I suppose I’ll talk more about contraception. I
don’t think it’s as bad as it was in [city] you know, whenwe had
lots of women who almost used [.] termination as a form of
contraception. Especially people like ballet dancers or with,
with anorexia or people that just didn’t want to, you know, takeany kind of Pill, or yeah anything that might affect their weight.
(GP6, female)
Similar dismissals of contraceptive side-effects are observed by
Hayter (2007) in his analysis of nurse prescribing practices. Such
accounts must be viewed in light of the historical redistribution of
the bodily burdens of heterosexuality which has accompanied the
development of contemporary contraceptive technologies. The
second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development
and proliferation of hormonal contraceptives focussed on female
bodies (e.g. intrauterine devices, oral contraceptives, implants). As
feminist scholars have long argued, such methods provide women
withmore ‘effective’methods of avoiding the burdens of pregnancy
but simultaneously code bodily responsibility for contraception as
a ‘feminine’ rather than a ‘masculine’ problem (Luker, 1975;
Oudshoorn, 2003).Alternative enactments?
I have suggested that health professionals’ illustrations of the
work that is required to enact abortion as evidence of a ‘ﬁxable’
problem with contraception implicitly demonstrate the ontologi-
cally ‘multiple’ nature of both abortion and contraception. Another
way in which this multiplicity is rendered visible by the interview
data is through the alternative sets of practices through which
contraception/abortion was enacted by some health professionals.
Many of these alternative practices are exempliﬁed by the
following extract from GP8. I quote this interviewee at some length
because, in reﬂecting on the issue of so-called ‘repeat’ abortion, she
enacts several contraceptions/abortions which bear little resem-
blance to those considered in the discussion so far:
P: Well I mean in Eastern Europe it’s the main form of fertility
control. I’mnot saying it’s the right form [.] it’s rather as if, you
know, the horse had bolted. But it is deﬁnitely a form of indi-
vidual fertility control. Um it’s not encouraged in this country,
there’s lots of better ways of controlling your fertility. But repeat
aborters are, I think, a fascinating group [.] You know [.]
there’s such a grade of behaviour about sort of concepts or
constructs about health and medical treatment and what not. I
mean some women think absolutely nothing about having
operation after operation after operation, and the sort of Laura
Ashley brigade wouldn’t even dream of taking contraceptive
Pills or, you know, some women probably think there’s nothing
wrong with having termination after termination. But I mean it,
I think it’s sometimes to dowith coercive partners. And I have no
truck at all with these arrogant gynaecologists who wag their
ﬁngers and say, ‘You silly girl’ and things. [.] But I think it also
depends on women’s fertility I mean a lot of women get away
with it, whereas some women seem to be exceedingly fertile!
I: When you mentioned coercive partners before was that, were
you referring to sex, or to [.] coercing women into
terminations?
P: Well, could be either really. But when I say um unplanned,
unwanted pregnancies, coercive partners who, for one reason or
another don’t use condoms, for instance. (GP8, female)
Towards the beginning of this extract, abortion is enacted not as
evidence of women’s ‘failure’ to control their reproductive bodies
through contraception but as evidence of an (albeit inadvisable) form
of female reproductive agency. Through its connection to healthcare
provision more broadly, contraception/abortion then becomes
evidence of the contested status of ‘health’ and the varieties of ways
in which patients enact this concept through their approaches to
medical treatment. Further on, contraception/abortion is suddenly
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the fertility of women’s bodies. Such fertility is enacted as a state that
is unevenly and uncertainly spread across the female population.
Through this practice, rather than evidencing a patient’s ‘problems’
with contraception, abortion is transformed into an indicator of
a patient’s fertility. Finally, when GP8 emphasises the heterosexual
relationships through which pregnancies are produced, she enacts
abortion as another kind of indicator: of the constraints which such
relationships can impose on the forms of reproductive agency
available to women.
Conclusion
This paper has utilised Scottish health professionals’ descrip-
tions of the provision of contraceptive advice during abortion
consultations to highlight the socio-material practices upon which
the realities of contraception/abortion depend. In illustrating these
processes, it has provided new empirical insights concerning the
provision of advice about contraception in Scottish abortion prac-
tice. It has also demonstrated that conceptual insights from STS (in
particular, the work of Mol, 2002) offer a useful framework through
which to extend the scope of existing social scientiﬁc enquiry
concerning the provision of techniques of fertility prevention.
As highlighted in the introduction, literature in this ﬁeld has
tended to position nonhumans as uninvolved in, and unaffected by,
human (social) actions. In contrast, the analysis presented here has
illustrated how the reality of contraception/abortion depends upon
a complex set of humanenonhuman interactions (or socio-material
practices). By drawing attention to the complexities of this work, it
has rendered visible the ontologically ‘multiple’ (Mol, 2002) nature
of these techniques of fertility prevention, thus affording oppor-
tunities to consider that the reality of contraception/abortionmight
‘be done differently’ (Law, 2008, p. 635).
Whilst emphasising this potential multiplicity, however, the
preceding discussion has also highlighted the way in which
contraception/abortion realities are contained (or, to use Mol’s
term, ‘co-ordinated’). Speciﬁcally, it has demonstrated the extent
to which the contraception/abortion reality described by health
professionals converges with that enacted by healthcare policy.
One reason for this is suggested by the linkages which nonhumans,
in the form of clinic protocols, create between the contraception/
abortion enacted through policy and that enacted in the clinic.
Through healthcare quality targets and written policies, rising
abortion rates are enacted as evidence of problems with contra-
ception which health professionals have ‘failed’ to ﬁx. Within the
clinic such enactments are ‘made durable’ (Latour, 1991) through
referral forms which ask GPs to indicate what future contraception
their patients will be using, and through clinic protocols which
require women to leave with an ‘identiﬁable form of
contraception’.
The analysis presented here has clear implications for those
involved in formulating such policies, because it raises important
questions about the forms of healthcare practice which these
policies sustain. Speciﬁcally, as noted above, in order for health
professionals to enact contraception/abortion in ways that accord
with policy, they must perform particular kinds of work on female
fertility, female subjectivity and heterosexual relationships. This
work involves transforming female fertility into a predictable,
controllable state, translating heterosexual relationships into
a ‘problem’ of individual women’s health and e perhaps most
signiﬁcantly e transforming women seeking abortion into subjects
who have no agency in relation to techniques of fertility prevention.
Indications of ways in which the contraception/abortion reality
might be e and is sometimes - ‘done differently’ emerge from the
minority of cases in which health professionals described engagingin alternative socio-material practices. These practices included
treating abortion as evidence of an uneven and uncertain distri-
bution of fertility which ‘burdens’ some heterosexual women’s
bodies more than others, as evidence of the power differentials
which routinely characterise heterosexual encounters, and as
a form of individual reproductive agency. Through such practices,
abortion becomes decoupled from contraception in ways which
could arguably be said to ‘multiply’ the forms of subjectivity
available to health professionals and their patients.
In drawing attention to these alternative enactments, this
analysis is also a situated (Haraway, 1991) intervention, which
produces particular kinds of reality through particular kinds of
practices. Most notably, it has relied upon a very limited set of data
(health professionals’ interview accounts) to make arguments
about the realities that may be enacted during the provision of
contraceptive advice within consultations about abortion. Even if
there are good reasons to treat health professionals as ethnogra-
phers of the events that have happened to them (Mol, 2002),
interviews with this single group of actors clearly provide very
restricted insights into the socio-material complexities of health-
care practice. In addition to preventing the observation of humane
nonhuman interactions, this form of data makes it difﬁcult to
consider the practices which patients may engage in to enact
themselves as agents during encounters with health professionals
(Lowe, 2005; Lupton, 2003). Observation of the dynamics of health
professionalepatient interactions concerning contraceptive/abor-
tion provision represents one important means through which
future research might address this limitation. Perhaps more crucial
however, is the development of a better understanding of the ways
in which the realities of contraception and abortion are enacted
through the practices which Scottish women and men engage in,
beyond the medicalized context of the clinic.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council [PTA-031-2005-00238]; theWellcome Trust[095720/Z/11/Z].
I would like to thank Isabel Fletcher, Nina Hallowell, Catherine
Montgomery and Sarah Parry, as well as my anonymous peer
reviewers, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
manuscript.
References
Aitken-Swann, J. (1977). Fertility control and the medical profession. London:
Croom Helm.
Ali, K. A. (2002). Planning the family in Egypt: New bodies, new selves. Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press.
Allen, I. (1985). Counselling services for sterilisation, vasectomy and termination of
pregnancy. London: Policy Studies Institute.
Barrett, G., & Harper, R. (2000). Health professionals’ attitudes to the deregulation
of emergency contraception (or the problem of female sexuality). Sociology of
Health and Illness, 22(2), 197e216.
Beynon-Jones, S. M. (2012). Timing is everything: the demarcation of ‘later’ abor-
tions in Scotland. Social Studies of Science, 42(1), 53e74.
Beynon-Jones, S. M. Expecting motherhood? Stratifying reproduction in 21st-
century Scottish abortion practice. Sociology, in press.
Boyle, M. (1997). Rethinking abortion: Psychology, gender, power and the law. London:
Routledge.
Brookes, B. (1988). Abortion in England 1900e1967. London: Croom Helm.
Clarke, A. E. (1998). Disciplining reproduction: Modernity, American life sciences, and
“the problems of sex”. London: University of California Press.
Davis, G., & Davidson, R. (2005). “Big white chief”, “Pontius Pilate”, and the
“Plumber”: the impact of the 1967 Abortion Act on the Scottish medical
community, c.1967e1980. Social History of Medicine, 18(2), 283e306.
Department of Health. (2009). Moving forward: Progress and priorities e Working
together for high quality sexual health: Government response to the Independent
Advisory Group’s review of the National Strategy for Sexual Health and HIV.
London: Department of Health.
Georges, E. (1996). Abortion policy and practice in Greece. Social Science & Medicine,
42(4), 509e519.
S.M. Beynon-Jones / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 105e112112Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. London:
Free Association Books.
Harris, L., Debbink, M., Martin, L., & Hassinger, J. (2011). Dynamics of stigma in
abortion work: ﬁndings from a pilot study of the Providers Share Workshop.
Social Science & Medicine, 73, 1062e1070.
Hawkes, G. (1996). A sociology of sex and sexuality. Buckingham: Open University
Press.
Hayter, M. (2007). Nurses’ discourse in contraceptive prescribing: an analysis
using Foucault’s ‘procedures of exclusion’. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 58(4),
358e367.
Horobin, G. (Ed.), (1973). Experience with abortion: A case study of North East Scot-
land. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Information Services Division Scotland. (2011). Abortion statistics e Year ending 31
December 2010. Accessed from http://www.isdscotland.scot.nhs.uk/Health-
Topics/Sexual-Health/Publications/2011-05-31/2011-05-31-Abortions-Report.
pdf?909060240.
Joffe, C. (1986). The regulation of sexuality: Experiences of family planning workers.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Latour, B. (1991). Technology is society made durable. In J. Law (Ed.), A sociology of
monsters: Essays on power, technology and domination (pp. 103e131). London:
Routledge.
Law, J. (2008). On sociology and STS. The Sociological Review, 56(4), 623e649.
Lipp, A. (2010). Conceding and concealing judgment in termination of pregnancy:
a grounded theory study. Journal of Research in Nursing, 15(4), 365e378.
Lipp, A. (2011). Stigma in abortion care: application to a grounded theory study.
Contemporary Nurse, 37(2), 115e123.
Lowe, P. (2005). Embodied expertise: women’s perceptions of the contraception
consultation. Health, 9(3), 361e378.
Luker, K. (1975). Taking chances: Abortion and the decision not to contracept. London:
University of California Press.
Lupton, D. (2003). Medicine as culture: Illness, disease and the body in western
societies. London: SAGE.
Macintyre, S. (1977). Single and pregnant. London: Croom Helm.
McLaren, A. (1990). A history of contraception: From antiquity to the present day.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Medical Foundation for AIDS & Sexual Health (MedFASH). (2008). Progress and
priorities eWorking together for high quality sexual health: Review of the National
Strategy for Sexual Health and HIV. London: MedFASH.Mol, A. (2002). The body multiple: Ontology in medical practice. London: Duke
University Press.
National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health. (2005). Long-
acting reversible contraception: The effective and appropriate use of long-acting
reversible contraception. London: RCOG Press.
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland. (2008). Standards e March 2008: Sexual health
services. Edinburgh & Glasgow: NHS Quality Improvement Scotland.
Nicholson, J., Slade, P., & Fletcher, J. (2010). Termination of pregnancy services:
experiences of gynaecological nurses. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 66(10),
2245e2256.
O’Donnell, J., Weitz, T. A., & Freedman, L. R. (2011). Resistance and vulnerability
to stigmatization in abortion work. Social Science & Medicine, 73, 1357e
1364.
Oudshoorn, N. (2003). The male Pill: A biography of a technology in the making.
London: Duke University Press.
Paxson, H. (2004). Making modern mothers: Ethics and family planning in urban
Greece. London: University of California Press.
Renne, E. P. (1997). Local and institutional interpretations of IUDs in southwestern
Nigeria. Social Science & Medicine, 44(8), 1141e1148.
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., & Elam, G. (2003). Designing and selecting samples. In J. Ritchie,
& J. Lewis (Eds.), Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students
and researchers (pp. 77e108). London: SAGE.
Roberts, C. (2007). Messengers of sex: Hormones, biomedicine and feminism. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ruhl, L. (2002). Dilemmas of the will: uncertainty, reproduction and the rhetoric of
control. Signs, 27(3), 641e663.
Russell, A., Sobo, E. J., & Thompson, M. S. (Eds.), (2000). Contraception across
cultures: Technologies, choices, constraints. Oxford: Berg.
Sheldon, S. (1997). Beyond control: Medical power and abortion law. London: Pluto
Press.
Simonds, W., & Ellertson, C. (2004). Emergency contraception and morality:
reﬂections of health care workers and clients. Social Science & Medicine, 58(7),
1285e1297.
Thomas, H. (1985). The medical construction of the contraceptive career. In
H. Homans (Ed.), The sexual politics of reproduction (pp. 45e63). Aldershot:
Gower.
Ziebland, S. (1999). Emergency contraception: an anomalous position in the family
planning repertoire? Social Science & Medicine, 49(10), 1409e1417.
